Abstract. If computer systems are to be designed to foster resilient performance it is important to be able to identify contributors to resilience. The emerging practice of Resilience Engineering has identified that people are still a primary source of resilience, and that the design of distributed systems should provide ways of helping people and organisations to cope with complexity. Although resilience has been identified as a desired property, researchers and practitioners do not have a clear understanding of what manifestations of resilience look like. This paper discusses some examples of strategies that people can adopt that improve the resilience of a system. Critically, analysis reveals that the generation of these strategies is only possible if the system facilitates them. As an example, this paper discusses practices, such as reflection, that are known to encourage resilient behavior in people. Reflection allows systems to better prepare for oncoming demands. We show that contributors to the practice of reflection manifest themselves at different levels of abstraction: from individual strategies to practices in, for example, control room environments. The analysis of interaction at these levels enables resilient properties of a system to be 'seen', so that systems can be designed to explicitly support them. We then present an analysis of resilience at an organisational level within the nuclear domain. This highlights some of the challenges facing the Resilience Engineering approach and the need for using a collective language to articulate knowledge of resilient practices across domains.
Introduction
In this paper we analyse manifestations of resilient practice at different levels of abstraction from the individual working with simple artefacts to more complex team working situations. Resilience markers can be any system feature or procedure that enables resilient practice to manifest. Identifying these markers may provide useful performance indicators, and allow the resilient characteristics of a system to be communicated, so that existing features or procedures can be augmented in a way that increases the capacity for resilience beyond that which is already present.
Resilience markers specify the conditions that need to hold for a system to perform resiliently. In addition to enabling the detection of error-prone or non-resilient computer systems, our approach provides a means of reasoning about resilience. This allows us to look at distributed systems from a new perspective. Resilience engineering takes the view that resilience is a characteristic of a system. This implies that a holistic perspective is required to develop an understanding. We are aware that the levels of granularity presented here are interrelated and so they should be considered collectively. However, much more work is needed to integrate these different levels. Indeed it could be argued that the nature of resilience goes against a level-based composition, however, our central focus is on finding evidence for resilience in the behaviour we observe, and identifying what type of behaviour we would classify as resilient. The aim of this approach is to develop an understanding of the system attributes that encourage people to engage in resilient activities (see Sections 3 and 4). We also discuss the difficulties of understanding resilience issues at an organisational level by presenting a case study from the nuclear domain (see Section 5). The examples presented in this paper should not be considered a full set of resilient behaviours that need to be supported: they have been selected as being representative of different levels of granularity that researchers and practitioners need to consider when designing systems that foster resilient performance (see Table 1 ). 
